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SCOTT’S PROBLEM FOR PROPER SCOTT SETS
VICTORIA GITMAN
Abstract. Some 40 years ago, Dana Scott proved that every countable Scott
set is the standard system of a model of PA. Two decades later, Knight and
Nadel extended his result to Scott sets of size ω1. Here, I show that assuming
the Proper Forcing Axiom (PFA), every proper Scott set is the standard system
of a model of PA. I define that a Scott set X is proper if it is arithmetically
closed and the quotient Boolean algebra X/Fin is a proper partial order. I also
investigate the question of the existence of proper Scott sets.
1. Introduction
In this paper, I use the Proper Forcing Axiom (PFA) to make partial progress
on a half-century-old question in the folklore of models of Peano Arithmetic about
whether every Scott set is the standard system of a model of PA. The Proper
Forcing Axiom is a generalization of Martin’s Axiom that has found application in
many areas of set theory in recent years. I will show that, assuming PFA, every
arithmetically closed Scott set whose quotient Boolean algebra X/Fin is proper is
the standard system of a model of PA.
I will begin with some technical and historical details. We can associate to
every model M of PA a certain collection of subsets of the natural numbers called
its standard system, in short SSy(M). The natural numbers N form the initial
segment of every model of PA. The standard system consists of sets that arise as
intersections of the definable (with parameters) sets of the model with the standard
part N. One thinks of the standard system as the traces left by the definable sets
of the model on the natural numbers. A different way of characterizing sets in the
standard system uses the notion of coding. Let us say that a set A ⊆ N is coded in a
model M if M has an element a such that (a)n = 1 if and only if n ∈ A. Here, (a)x
can refer to any of the reader’s favorite methods of coding with elements of a model
of PA, e.g., by defining (a)x as the x
th digit in the binary expansion of a. It is easy
to see that for nonstandard models we can equivalently define the standard system
to be the collection of all subsets of the natural numbers coded in the model.
What features characterize standard systems? Without reference to models of
arithmetic, a standard system is just a particular collection of subsets of the natural
numbers. Can we come up with a list of elementary (set theoretic, computability
theoretic, etc.) properties that X ⊆ P(N) must satisfy in order to be the standard
system of some model of PA? The notion of a Scott set encapsulates three key
features of standard systems.
Definition 1.1. X ⊆ P(N) is a Scott set if
(1) X is a Boolean algebra of sets.
I would like to thank my Ph.D. advisor Joel David Hamkins, Roman Kossak, and Ali Enayat
for their many helpful suggestions.
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(2) If A ∈ X and B is Turing computable from A, then B ∈ X. 1
(3) If T is an infinite binary tree coded by a set in X, then X has a set coding
some path through T .
It is relatively easy to see that every standard system is a Scott set (see [?], p.
175). Conversely, Dana Scott proved in 1962 that every countable Scott set is the
standard system of a model of PA [?]. The proof relies on the fact that Scott sets
are powerful enough to carry out internally the Henkin construction used to prove
the Completeness Theorem. A crucial fact used in the proof is that if a set in the
Scott set codes a consistent theory (again using the reader’s favorite coding), then
the Scott set must contain some completion of that theory as well. This follows
easily if one is familiar with the relationship between building completions of a
theory and branches through binary trees (see [?] p. 177-182 for a modern version
of Scott’s proof). So as the first step toward characterizing standard systems, we
have:
Theorem 1.2 (Scott, 1962). Every countable Scott set is the standard system of a
model of PA.
Thus, countable Scott sets are exactly the countable standard systems of models
of PA. Scott’s theorem leads naturally to the following folklore question:
Scott’s Problem. Is every Scott set the standard system of a model of PA?
In 1982, Knight and Nadel settled the question for Scott sets of size ω1.
Theorem 1.3 (Knight and Nadel, 1982). Every Scott set of size ω1 is the standard
system of a model of PA. [?]
It follows that Scott sets of size ω1 are exactly the standard systems of size ω1
of models of PA. I will give a proof of Theorem 1.3 shortly.
Corollary 1.4. If CH holds, then Scott’s Problem has a positive answer.
Very little is known about Scott’s Problem if CH fails, that is, for Scott sets
of size larger than ω1. I will use the techniques of forcing together with forcing
axioms to find new conditions under which given a Scott set we can build a model
of PA with that Scott set as the standard system. Given a Scott set X, we obtain a
partial order X/Fin consisting of the infinite sets in X under the ordering of almost
inclusion. Let us call a Scott set X proper if it is arithmetically closed and the
poset X/Fin is proper (see Section 2 for the definition of properness and PFA and
Section 3 for the significance of arithmetic closure). My main theorem is:
Main Theorem. Assuming PFA, every proper Scott set is the standard system of
a model of PA.
I will prove the main theorem by first generalizing a theorem known as Ehren-
feucht’s Lemma to uncountable models using PFA. Ehrenfeucht’s Lemma is an
unpublished result of Ehrenfeucht from around the 1970’s 2. One can use Ehren-
feucht’s Lemma to give a proof of Theorem 1.3. Similarly, my generalized version
is used to prove the main theorem. It is instructive to see a proof of Ehrenfeucht’s
1Conditions (1) and (2) together imply that if A1, . . . An ∈ X and B is computable from
A1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ An, then B ∈ X.
2Roman Kossak, personal communication.
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Lemma to understand the difficulties involved in extending it to uncountable models
(the proof below follows [?]).
Theorem 1.5 (Ehrenfeucht’s Lemma). If M is a countable model of PA whose
standard system is contained in a Scott set X, then for any A ∈ X there is an
elementary extension M ≺ N such that A ∈ SSy(N) ⊆ X.
Proof. First, we consider nonstandardM . Let X be a Scott set such that SSy(M) ⊆
X and let A ∈ X. Choose a countable Scott set Y ⊆ X containing SSy(M) and A.
Using the truth predicate for Σn-formulas, we can prove that the Σn-theory of M
is coded by a set in SSy(M) for every n. Moreover, all computable theories are in
SSy(M) since SSy(M) is a Scott set. Therefore, the theory T :=“PA + Σ1-theory
of M” is in SSy(M). The idea that the Henkin construction can be carried out
inside a Scott gives more than just Theorem 1.2. From this it follows that for any
theory T ⊇ PA such that T ∩ Σn ∈ X for every n ∈ N, there exists a model of T
with that Scott set as the standard system. In particular, we get a model M∗ of
T with SSy(M∗) = Y. By Friedman’s Embedding Theorem (see [?], p. 161), since
M∗ |= “Σ1-theory of M” and SSy(M) ⊆ Y, we have M ≺∆0 M
∗. Close M under
initial segment and call the resulting submodel N . Then M ≺ N since it is cofinal
and ∆0-elementary (by Gaifman’s Embedding Theorem, see [?], p. 87). But also
SSy(N) = SSy(M∗) = Y as required since N is an initial segment of M∗. This
completes the proof for nonstandard models. Let TA := {ϕ | N |= ϕ} denote True
Arithmetic. It is clear that N ≺ N if and only if N |= TA. The standard system of
N is the collection of all arithmetic sets. So suppose that X is a Scott set containing
all arithmetic sets and fix A ∈ X. It follows that TA ∩ Σn is in X for every n ∈ N.
Let Y ⊆ X be a countable Scott set containing A and TA∩Σn for every n ∈ N. By
the remark above, there exists a model N |= TA whose standard system is exactly
Y. Thus, N ≺ N and A ∈ SSy(N) ⊆ X. 
We are now ready to prove Knight and Nadel’s result. 3
Proof of Theorem 1.3. Let X be a Scott set of size ω1 and enumerate X = {Aξ |
ξ < ω1}. The idea is to build up a model with the Scott set X as the standard
system in ω1 steps by successively throwing in one more set at each step and using
Ehrenfeucht’s Lemma to stay within X. More precisely, we will define an elementary
chainM0 ≺M1 ≺ · · · ≺Mξ ≺ · · · of length ω1 of countable models of PA such that
SSy(Mξ) ⊆ X and Aξ ∈ SSy(Mξ+1). Then clearly M = ∪ξ<ω1Mξ will work. Let
M0 be any countable model of PA with SSy(M0) ⊆ X. Such M0 exists by Scott’s
theorem (1.2). Given Mξ, by Ehrenfeucht’s Lemma, there exists Mξ+1 such that
Mξ ≺ Mξ+1, the set Aξ ∈ SSy(Mξ+1), and SSy(Mξ+1) ⊆ X. At limit stages take
unions. 
The key ideas in the proof of Theorem 1.3 can be summarized in the following
definition and theorem:
Definition 1.6 (The κ-Ehrenfeucht Principle for Γ). Let κ be a cardinal and Γ
some collection of Scott sets. The κ-Ehrenfeucht Principle for Γ states that ifM is a
model of PA of size less than κ and X is a Scott set in Γ such that SSy(M) ⊆ X, then
for any A ∈ X there is an elementary extensionM ≺ N such that A ∈ SSy(N) ⊆ X.
3This is not Knight and Nadel’s original proof.
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If Γ is the collection of all Scott sets, we will say simply that the κ-Ehrenfeucht
Principle holds.
In view of Definition 1.6, Ehrenfeucht’s Lemma (Theorem 1.5) is the
ω1-Ehrenfeucht Principle. We can freely assume that the elementary extension
N given by the κ-Ehrenfeucht Principle has size less than κ since if this is not the
case, we can always take an elementary submodel N ′ of N such that M ≺ N ′ and
A ∈ SSy(N ′). A completely straightforward generalization of the proof of Theorem
1.3 gives:
Theorem 1.7. If the κ-Ehrenfeucht Principle for Γ holds, then every Scott set in
Γ of size κ is the standard system of a model of PA.
Thus, one approach to solving Scott’s Problem would be to try to prove the
ω2-Ehrenfeucht Principle for some collection of Scott sets. However, proofs of
Ehrenfeucht’s Lemma hinge precisely on those techniques in the field of models
of PA that appear to work only with countable models. As an example, Friedman’s
famous Embedding Theorem does not generalize to uncountable models.4 In what
follows, I will mainly investigate the Ehrenfeucht principles. The results on Scott’s
Problem will follow as a corollary. Under PFA, I will show that the ω2-Ehrenfeucht
Principle for proper Scott sets holds (Theorem 3.4).
2. Set Theory and Scott’s Problem
Since the result of Knight and Nadel (Theorem 1.3), very little progress had
been made on Scott’s Problem until some recent work of Fredrik Engstro¨m [?]. It
is not difficult to believe that Scott’s Problem past ω1 might have a set theoretic
resolution. Engstro¨m followed a strategy, suggested more than a decade earlier
by Joel Hamkins and others, to use forcing axioms to gain new insight into the
problem. We saw that a positive answer to Scott’s Problem follows from CH. It is
a standard practice in set theoretic proofs that if a statement follows from CH, we
try to prove it or its negation from ¬CH + Martin’s Axiom. Martin’s Axiom (MA)
is a forcing axiom which asserts that for every c.c.c. poset P and every collection
D of less than the continuum many dense subsets of P, there is a filter on P that
meets all of them. Such filters are often called partially generic filters. Engstro¨m
tried to use Martin’s Axiom to find new techniques for building models of PA whose
standard system is a given Scott set.
Given a Scott set X, Engstro¨m chose the poset X/Fin, whose elements are infinite
sets in X ordered by almost inclusion. That is, for infinite A and B in X, we say
that A ≤ B if and only if A ⊆Fin B. Observe that X/Fin is forcing equivalent to
forcing with the Boolean algebra X modulo the ideal of finite sets. A familiar and
thoroughly studied instance of this poset is P(N)/Fin. A Scott set is arithmetically
closed if whenever A is in it and B is arithmetically definable from A, then B is also
in it (for a more extensive discussion, see Section 3). For a property of posets P, if
X is an arithmetically closed Scott set and X/Fin has P, I will simply say that X
has property P. An important point to be noted here is that whenever a Scott set
X is discussed as a poset, I will always be assuming that it is arithmetically closed.
The significance of arithmetic closure will become apparent in Section 3.
4Here ω1-like models are an obvious counterexample.
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Theorem 2.1 (Engstro¨m, 2004). Assuming Martin’s Axiom, every c.c.c. Scott set
of size less than the continuum is the standard system of a model of PA. [?]
To obtain models for Scott sets for which we could not do so before, Engstro¨m
needed that there are uncountable Scott sets that are c.c.c.. Unfortunately:
Theorem 2.2. Every c.c.c. Scott set is countable.
Proof. Let X be a Scott set. If x is a finite subset of N, let pxq denote the code of x
using Go¨del’s coding. For every A ∈ X, define an associated A′ = {pA∩nq | n ∈ N}.
Clearly A′ is computable from A, and hence in X. Observe that if A 6= B, then
|A′ ∩ B′| < ω. Hence if A 6= B, we get that A′ and B′ are incompatible in X/Fin.
It follows that A = {A′ | A ∈ X} is an antichain of X/Fin of size |X|. This shows
that X/Fin always has antichains as large as the whole poset. 
Thus, the poset X/Fin has the worst possible chain condition, namely |X|+-c.c..
Theorem 2.2 implies that no new instances of Scott’s Problem can be obtained from
Theorem 2.1.
I will borrow from Engstro¨m’s work the poset X/Fin. But my strategy will be
different in two respects. First, instead of MA, I will use the poset together with
the forcing axiom PFA, allowing me to get around the obstacle of Theorem 2.2.
In Section 7, I will argue that, unlike the case with c.c.c. Scott sets, uncountable
proper Scott sets do exist. However, I will not be able to explicitly obtain any new
instances of Scott’s Problem. Second, my main aim will be to obtain an extension of
Ehrenfeucht’s Lemma to uncountable models, while Engstro¨m’s was to directly get
a model whose standard system is a given Scott set. This approach will allow me to
handle Scott sets of size continuum, which had not been possible with Engstro¨m’s
techniques.
Recall that for a cardinal λ, the setHλ is the collection of all sets whose transitive
closure has size less than λ. Let P be a poset and λ be a cardinal greater than 2|P|.
Since we can always take an isomorphic copy of P on the cardinal |P|, we can assume
without loss of generality that P and P(P) are elements of Hλ. In particular, we
want to ensure that all dense subsets of P are in Hλ. Let M be a countable
elementary submodel of Hλ containing P as an element. If G is a filter on P, we say
that G is M -generic if for every maximal antichain A ∈ M of P, the intersection
G∩A∩M 6= ∅. It must be explicitly specified whatM -generic means in this context
since the usual notion of generic filters makes sense only for transitive structures
and M is not necessarily transitive. This definition of M -generic is closely related
to the definition for transitive structures. To see this, let M∗ be the Mostowski
collapse of M and P∗ be the image of P under the collapse. Let G∗ ⊆ P∗ be the
pointwise image of G ∩M under the collapse. Then G is M -generic if and only if
G∗ is M∗-generic for P∗ in the usual sense.
Definition 2.3. Let P ∈ Hλ be a poset and M be an elementary submodel of Hλ
containing P. Then a condition q ∈ P is M -generic if and only if every V -generic
filter G ⊆ P containing q is M -generic.
Definition 2.4. A poset P is proper if for every λ > 2|P| and every countable
M ≺ Hλ containing P, for every p ∈ P ∩M , there is an M -generic condition below
p.
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It can be shown that it is actually equivalent to consider only some fixed λ > 2|P|
and to show that generic conditions exist only for a club of countable M ≺ Hλ [?]
(p. 102).
Definition 2.5. The Proper Forcing Axiom (PFA) is the assertion that for every
proper poset P and every collection D of at most ω1 many dense subsets of P, there
is a filter on P that meets all of them.
Proper forcing was invented by Shelah, who sought a class of ω1-preserving
forcing notions that would be preserved under countable support iterations (for an
introduction to proper forcing see [?] (p. 601) or [?]). The two familiar classes
of ω1-preserving forcing notions, namely the c.c.c. and countably closed forcing
notions, turn out to be proper as well. The Proper Forcing Axiom, introduced
by Baumgartner [?], is easily seen to be a generalization of Martin’s Axiom since
c.c.c. posets are proper and PFA decides the size of the continuum is ω2. The later
fact is a highly nontrivial result in [?]. In many respects, however, PFA is very
much unlike MA. Not only does it decide the size of the continuum, the axiom also
has large cardinal strength. The best known large cardinal upper bound on the
consistency of PFA is a supercompact cardinal [?]. Much fruitful set theoretical
work in recent years has involved PFA and its consequences.
3. Proof of the Main Theorem
I will use PFA to prove the ω2-Ehrenfeucht Principle for proper Scott sets. The
main theorem will follow as a corollary.
A filter G on the poset X/Fin is easily seen to be a filter on the Boolean algebra
X. By extending G to a larger filter if necessary, we can assume without loss of
generality thatG is an ultrafilter. Recall that to prove the ω2-Ehrenfeucht Principle,
given a model M of size ω1 and a Scott set X such SSy(M) ⊆ X, we need to find for
every A ∈ X, an elementary extension N such that A ∈ SSy(N) ⊆ X. The strategy
will be to find ω1 many dense subsets of X/Fin such that if G is a partially generic
ultrafilter meeting all of them, then the standard system of the ultrapower of M
by G will stay within X. Thus, if X is proper, we will be able to use PFA to obtain
such an ultrafilter. I will also show that to every A ∈ X, there corresponds a set
B ∈ X/Fin such that whenever B is in an ultrafilter G, the set A will end up in the
ultrapower of M by G.
Let S ⊆ P(N) and expand the language of arithmetic LA to include unary
predicates for all A ∈ S. Then the structure NS = 〈N, A〉A∈S is a structure of
this expanded language with the natural interpretation. Since Scott sets are closed
under relative computability, basic computability theory arguments show that if X
is a Scott set, the structure NX = 〈N, A〉A∈X is closed under ∆1-definability. That
is, if B is ∆1-definable in NX, then B ∈ X.
Definition 3.1. A collection S ⊆ P(N) is arithmetically closed if the structure
NS = 〈N, A〉A∈S is closed under definability. That is, if B is definable in NS , then
B ∈ S.
A Scott set X is arithmetically closed simply when it satisfies Definition 3.1.
Observe actually that if S is arithmetically closed, then it is a Scott set. Thus,
arithmetic closure subsumes the definition of a Scott set. An easy induction on
the complexity of formulas establishes that if X is a Boolean algebra of sets and
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NX = 〈N, A〉A∈X is closed under Σ1-definability, then X is arithmetically closed.
Hence a Scott set is arithmetically closed if and only if it is closed under the Turing
jump operation.
Definition 3.2. Say that 〈Bn | n ∈ N〉 is coded in X if there is B ∈ X such
that Bn = {m ∈ N | 〈n,m〉 ∈ B}. Given 〈Bn | n ∈ N〉 coded in X and
C ∈ X/Fin, say that C decides 〈Bn | n ∈ N〉 if whenever U is an ultrafilter
on X and C ∈ U , then {n ∈ N | Bn ∈ U} ∈ X. Call a Scott set X decisive
if for every 〈Bn | n ∈ N〉 coded in X, the set D = {C ∈ X/Fin | C decides
〈Bn | n ∈ N〉} is dense in X/Fin.
Decisiveness is precisely the property of a Scott set which is required for our
proof of the main theorem. I will show below that decisiveness is equivalent to
arithmetic closure.
Lemma 3.3. The following are equivalent for a Scott set X:
(1) X is arithmetically closed.
(2) X is decisive.
(3) For every sequence 〈Bn | n ∈ N〉 coded in X, there is C ∈ X/Fin deciding
〈Bn | n ∈ N〉.
Proof.
(1)=⇒(2):5 Assume that X is arithmetically closed. Fix A ∈ X/Fin and a sequence
〈Bn | n ∈ N〉 coded in X. We need to show that there is an element in X/Fin
below A deciding 〈Bn | n ∈ N〉. For every finite binary sequence s, we will define
Bs by induction on the length of s. Let B∅ = A. Given Bs, where s has length n,
define Bs1 = Bs ∩ Bn and Bs0 = Bs ∩ (N − Bn). Define the binary tree T = {s ∈
2<ω | Bs is infinite}. Clearly T is infinite since if we split an infinite set into two
pieces one of them must still be infinite. Since X is arithmetically closed and T is
arithmetic in A and 〈Bn | n ∈ N〉, it follows that T ∈ X. Thus, X contains a cofinal
branch P through T . Define C = {bn | n ∈ N} such that b0 is least element of B∅
and bn+1 is least element of BP ↾n that is greater than bn. Clearly C is infinite and
C ⊆ A. Now suppose U is an ultrafilter on X and C ∈ U , then Bn ∈ U if and only
if C ⊆Fin Bn. Thus, {n ∈ N | Bn ∈ U} = {n ∈ N | C ⊆Fin Bn} ∈ X since X is
arithmetically closed.
(2)=⇒(3): Clear.
(3)=⇒(1)6: It suffices to show that X is closed under the Turing jump operation.
Fix A ∈ X and define the sequence 〈Bn | n ∈ N〉 by k ∈ Bn if and only if the
Turing program coded by n with oracle A halts on input n in less than k many
steps. Clearly the sequence is computable from A, and hence coded in X. Let
H = {n ∈ N | the program coded by n with oracle A halts on input n} be the
halting problem for A. It should be clear that n ∈ H implies that Bn is cofinite
and n /∈ H implies that Bn = ∅. Let C ∈ X/Fin deciding 〈Bn | n ∈ N〉 and
U be any ultrafilter containing C, then {n ∈ N | Bn ∈ U} ∈ X. But this set is
exactly H . This shows that H ∈ X, and hence X is closed under the Turing jump
operation. 
Theorem 3.4. Assuming PFA, the ω2-Ehrenfeucht Principle for proper Scott sets
holds. That is, if X is a proper Scott set and M is a model of PA of size ω1 whose
5Similar arguments have appeared in [?] and other places.
6I am grateful to Joel Hamkins for pointing out this argument.
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standard system is contained in X, then for any A ∈ X, there is an elementary
extension M ≺ N such that A ∈ SSy(N) ⊆ X.
Proof. I will build N using a variation on the ultrapower construction introduced by
Kirby and Paris [?]. Fix a modelM of PA and a Scott set X such that SSy(M) ⊆ X.
Let G be some ultrafilter on X. If f : N → M , we say that f is coded in M when
there is a ∈ M such that (a)n = f(n) for all n ∈ N. Given f and g coded in
M , define f ∼G g if {n ∈ N | f(n) = g(n)} ∈ G. The definition makes sense
since clearly {n ∈ N | f(n) = g(n)} ∈ SSy(M) ⊆ X. The classical ultrapower
construction uses an ultrafilter on P(N) and all functions from N to M . This
construction uses only functions coded inM , and therefore needs only an ultrafilter
on SSy(M) ⊆ X. As in the classical construction, we get an equivalence relation
and a well-defined LA structure on the equivalence classes. The proof relies on the
fact that X is a Boolean algebra. Call ΠXM/G the collection of equivalence classes
[f ]G where f is coded in M . Also, as usual, we get:
Lemma 3.4.1.  Los´ Lemma holds. That is, ΠXM/G |= ϕ([f ]G) if and only if
{n ∈ N |M |= ϕ(f(n))} ∈ G.
Proof. Similar to the classical proof of the  Los´ Lemma. 
Lemma 3.4.2. For every A ∈ X, there is B ∈ X/Fin such that if G is any ultrafilter
on X containing B, then A ∈ SSy(ΠXM/G).
Proof. Let χA be the characteristic function of A. For every n ∈ N, define Bn =
{m ∈ N | (m)n = χA(n)}. Then clearly each Bn ∈ X and 〈Bn | n ∈ N〉 is coded in
X since the sequence is arithmetic in A. Observe that the intersection of any finite
number of Bn is infinite. Let B = {bn | n ∈ N} where b0 is least element of B0
and bn+1 is least element of ∩m≤n+1Bm that is greater than bn. Then B ⊆Fin Bn
for all n ∈ N and B ∈ X since it is arithmetic in 〈Bn : n ∈ N〉. It follows that if
G is any ultrafilter containing B, then G must contain all the Bn as well. Let G
be an ultrafilter containing B. Let id : N → N be the identity function. I claim
that ([id]G)n = χA(n). It will follow that A ∈ SSy(ΠXM/G). But this is true since
([id]G)n = χA(n) if and only if {m ∈ N | (m)n = χA(n)} = Bn ∈ G. 
Lemma 3.4.2 tells us that if we want to add some set A to the standard system
of the ultrapower that we are building, we just have to make sure that a correct
set gets put into the ultrafilter. It follows that that we can build ultrapowers of M
having any given element of X in the standard system.
The crucial step of the construction is to find a family of size ω1 of dense subsets
of X/Fin such that if the ultrafilter meets all members of the family, the stan-
dard system of the ultrapower stays within X. It is in this step that we need the
decisiveness of X.
Recall that a set E is in the standard system of a nonstandard model if and only
if there is an element e such that E = {n ∈ N | (e)n = 1}, meaning E is coded in
the model. Thus, we have to show that the sets coded by elements of ΠXM/G are
in X.
Lemma 3.4.3. For every function f : N→M coded in M , there is a dense subset
Df of X/Fin such that if G meets Df , then [f ]G ∈ ΠXM/G codes a set in X.
Proof. Fix a function f : N → M coded in M and let Ef = {n ∈ N | ΠXM/G |=
([f ]G)n = 1}. By  Los´ Lemma, ΠXM/G |= ([f ]G)n = 1 if and only if
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{m ∈ N | (f(m))n = 1} ∈ G. Define Bn,f = {m ∈ N | (f(m))n = 1} and
note that 〈Bn,f | n ∈ N〉 is coded in SSy(M). Observe that n ∈ Ef if and only
if Bn,f ∈ G. Thus, we have to make sure that {n ∈ N | Bn,f ∈ G} ∈ X. Let
Df = {C ∈ X/Fin | C decides 〈Bn,f | n ∈ N〉}. Since X is decisive, Df is dense.
Clearly if G meets Df , the set coded by [f ]G will be in X. 
Now we can finish the proof of Theorem 3.4. Let D = {Df | f : N → M is
coded in M}. Since M has size ω1, the collection D has size ω1 also. Assuming
PFA guarantees that we can find an ultrafilter G meeting every Df ∈ D. But this
is precisely what forces the standard system of ΠXM/G to stay inside X. 
The main theorem now follows directly from Theorem 3.4.
Proof of Main Theorem. Since PFA implies 2ω = ω2 and Scott sets of size ω1 are
already handled by Knight and Nadel’s result, we only need to consider Scott sets of
size ω2. But the result for these follows from Theorem 1.7 and the ω2-Ehrenfeucht
Principle established by Theorem 3.4. 
4. Extensions of Ehrenfeucht’s Lemma
Below, I will go through some results related to the question of extending Ehren-
feucht’s Lemma to models of size ω1 (ω2-Ehrenfeucht Principle).
Theorem 3.4 shows that in a universe satisfying PFA, the ω2-Ehrenfeucht Prin-
ciple for proper Scott sets holds. Next, I will use the same techniques to show that
the κ-Ehrenfeucht Principle for arithmetically closed Scott sets holds for all κ if we
only consider models with countable standard systems. For this argument, we do
not need to use PFA or properness.
Theorem 4.1. If M is a model of PA whose standard system is countable and
contained in an arithmetically closed Scott set X, then for any A ∈ X, there is an
elementary extension M ≺ N such that A ∈ SSy(N) ⊆ X.
Proof. Fix an arithmetically closed Scott set X and a model M of PA such that
SSy(M) is countable and contained in X. To mimic the proof of Theorem 3.4, we
need to find an ultrafilter G on X which meets the dense sets Df = {C ∈ X/Fin |
C decides 〈Bn,f | n ∈ N〉}. I claim that there are only countably many Df . If this
is the case, then such an ultrafilter exists without any forcing axiom assumption.
Given f : N → M , let Bf code 〈Bn,f | n ∈ N〉. There are possibly as many f as
elements ofM , but there can be only countably many Bf since each Bf ∈ SSy(M).
It remains only to observe that Df is determined by Bf . So there are as many Df
as there are different Bf . Thus, there are only countably many Df in spite of the
fact that M can be arbitrarily large. 
The same idea can be used to extend Theorem 3.4 to show that the κ-Ehrenfeucht
Principle for proper Scott sets holds for all κ if we consider only models whose
standard system has size ω1.
Theorem 4.2. Assuming PFA, if X is a proper Scott set and M is a model of PA
whose standard system has size ω1 and is contained in X, then for any A ∈ X, there
is an elementary extension M ≺ N such that A ∈ SSy(N) ⊆ X.
It is also an easy consequence of an amalgamation result for models of PA that
the κ-Ehrenfeucht Principle holds for all κ for models with a countable nonstandard
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elementary initial segment. Neither PFA nor arithmetic closure is required for this
result.
Theorem 4.3. Suppose M0, M1, and M2 are models of PA such that M0 ≺cof M1
and M0 ≺end M2. Then there is an amalgamation M3 of M1 and M2 over M0 such
that M1 ≺end M3 and M2 ≺cof M3. (See [?], p. 40)
Theorem 4.4. Suppose M is a model of PA with a countable nonstandard elemen-
tary initial segment and X is a Scott set such that SSy(M) ⊆ X. Then for any
A ∈ X, there is an elementary extension M ≺ N such that A ∈ SSy(N) ⊆ X.
Proof. Fix a set A ∈ X. Let K be a countable nonstandard elementary initial
segment of M , then SSy(K) = SSy(M). By Ehrenfeucht’s Lemma (Theorem 1.5),
there is an extension K ≺cof K
′ such that A ∈ SSy(K ′) ⊆ X. By Theorem 4.4,
there is a model N , an amalgamation of K ′ and M over K, such that K ′ ≺end N
and M ≺cof N . It follows that SSy(K ′) = SSy(N). Thus, A ∈ SSy(N) ⊆ X. 
Corollary 4.5. The κ-Ehrenfeucht Principle holds for ω1-like models for all car-
dinals κ.
These observations suggest that if the ω2-Ehrenfeucht Principle fails to hold, one
should look to models with an uncountable standard system for such a counterex-
ample.
5. Other Applications of X/Fin
It appears that X/Fin is a natural poset to use in several unresolved questions in
the field of models of PA. In the previous sections, I used it to find new conditions
for extending Ehrenfeucht’s Lemma and Scott’s Problem. Here, I will mention some
other instances in which the poset naturally arises.
Definition 5.1. Let L be some language extending the language of arithmetic LA.
We say that a model M of L satisfies PA∗ if M satisfies induction axioms in the
expanded language. If M |= PA∗, then M ⊆ N is a conservative extension if it is
a proper extension and every parametrically definable subset of N when restricted
to M is also definable in M .
Gaifman showed in [?] that for any countable language L, every M |= PA∗ in
L has a conservative elementary extension. A result of George Mills shows that
the statement fails for uncountable languages. Mills proved that every countable
nonstandard model M |= PA∗ in a countable language has an expansion to an
uncountable language such that M |= PA∗ in the expanded language, but has no
conservative elementary extension (see [?], p. 168). His techniques failed for the
standard model, leaving open the question whether there is an expansion of the
standard model N to some uncountable language that does not have a conservative
elementary extension. This question has recently been answered by Ali Enayat,
who demonstrated that there is always an uncountable arithmetically closed Scott
set X such that 〈N, A〉A∈X has no conservative elementary extension [?]. This raises
the question of whether we can say something general about Scott sets X for which
〈N, A〉A∈X has a conservative elementary extension.
Theorem 5.2. Assuming PFA, if X is a proper Scott set of size ω1, then 〈N, A〉A∈X
has a conservative elementary extension.
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Proof. Let LX be the language of arithmetic LA together with unary predicates
for sets in X. Let G be an ultrafilter on X. We define ΠXN/G, the ultrapower
of N by G, to consist of equivalence classes of functions coded in X. We have to
make this modification to the construction of the proof of Theorem 3.4 since the
idea of functions coded in the model clearly does not make sense for N. The usual
arguments show that we can impose an LX structure on ΠXN/G and  Los´ Lemma
holds. I will show, by choosing G carefully, that 〈ΠXN/G,A′〉A∈X is a conservative
extension of 〈N, A〉A∈X where A′ = {[f ]G ∈ ΠXN/G | {n ∈ N | f(n) ∈ A} ∈ G}.
Fix a set E definable in 〈ΠXN/G,A′〉A∈X by a formula ϕ(x, [f ]G). Observe that n ∈
E ↔ ΠXN/G |= ϕ(n, [f ]G)↔ Bϕ,fn = {m ∈ N | N |= ϕ(n, f(m))} ∈ G. Let Dϕ,f =
{C ∈ X/Fin | C decides 〈Bϕ,fn | n ∈ N〉}. The sets Dϕ,f are dense since X is
decisive. Clearly if G meets all the Dϕ,f , the ultrapower 〈ΠXN/G,A′〉A∈X will be a
conservative extension of 〈N, A〉A∈X. Finally, since X has size ω1, there are at most
ω1 many formulas ϕ of LX and functions f coded in X, and hence at most ω1 many
dense sets Dϕ,f . So we can find the desired G by PFA.
7

Another open question in the field of models of PA, for which X/Fin is relevant,
involves the existence of minimal cofinal extensions for uncountable models.
Definition 5.3. Let M be a model of PA, then M ≺ N is a minimal extension if
it is a proper extension and whenever M ≺ K ≺ N , either K =M or K = N .
Theorem 5.4. Every nonstandard countable model of PA has a minimal cofinal
extension. (See [?], p. 28)
Gaifman showed that every model of PA, regardless of cardinality, has a minimal
end extension [?].
Definition 5.5. Let X ⊆ P(N) be a Boolean algebra. If U is an ultrafilter on X,
we say that U is Ramsey if for every function f : N→ N coded in X, there is a set
A ∈ U such that f is either 1-1 or constant on A.
Lemma 5.6. If M is a nonstandard model of PA such that SSy(M) has a Ramsey
ultrafilter, then M has a minimal cofinal extension.8
Proof. Let U be a Ramsey ultrafilter on SSy(M). The strategy will be to show that
the ultrapower ΠSSy(M)M/U is a minimal cofinal extension of M . The meaning
of ΠSSy(M)M/U here is identical to the one in the proof of Theorem 3.4. First,
observe that for any ultrafilter U, we have ΠXM/U = Scl(M ∪{[id]U}), the Skolem
closure of the equivalence class of the identity function together with elements of
M . This holds since any [f ]U = t([id]U ) where t is the Skolem term defined by
f in M . Next, observe that such ultrapowers are always cofinal. To see this, fix
[f ]U ∈ ΠXM/U and let a > f(n) for all n ∈ N. Such a exists since f is coded
in M . Clearly [f ]U < [ca]U where ca(n) = a for all n ∈ N. These observations
hold for any Scott set X ⊇ SSy(M) and, in particular, for X = SSy(M). To show
that the extension ΠSSy(M)M/U is minimal, we fix M ≺ K ≺ ΠXM/U and show
that K = M or K = ΠXM/U . It suffices to see that [id]U ∈ Scl(M ∪ {[f ]U}) for
every [f ]U ∈ (ΠSSy(M)M/U)−M . Fix f : N →M and define g : N→ N such that
g(0) = 0 and g(n) = n if f(n) is not equal to f(m) for any m < n, or g(n) = m
where m is least such that f(m) = f(n). Observe that g ∈ SSy(M). Also for any
7The anonymous referee pointed out that similar arguments have appeared in [?].
8This was first proved by [?].
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A ⊆ N, the function g is 1-1 or constant on A if and only if f is. Since U is Ramsey,
g is either constant or 1-1 on some set A ∈ U . Hence f is either constant or 1-1 on
A as well. If f is constant on A, then [f ]U ∈M . If f is 1-1 on A, let s be the Skolem
term that is the inverse of f on A. Then clearly s([f ]U ) = [id]U . This completes
the argument that ΠSSy(M)M/U is a minimal cofinal extension of M . 
The converse to the above theorem does not hold. If M has a minimal cofinal
extension, it does not follow that there is a Ramsey ultrafilter on SSy(M).9
Theorem 5.7. Assuming PFA, Ramsey ultrafilters exist for proper Scott sets of
size ω1. Thus, if M is a model of PA and SSy(M) is proper of size ω1, then M has
a minimal cofinal extension.
Proof. The existence of a Ramsey ultrafilter involves being able to meet a family of
dense sets. To see this, fix f : N → N and observe that Df = {A ∈ SSy(M)/Fin |
f is 1-1 on A or f is constant on A} is dense. To see that Df is dense, actually
does not require that SSy(M) is arithmetically closed. 
The proof of Theorem 5.7 shows that any M with a countable standard system
will have a minimal cofinal extension since we do not need PFA to construct an
ultrafilter meeting countably many dense sets.
6. Weakening the Hypothesis
There are several ways in which the hypothesis of the main theorem can be
modified. PFA is a very strong set theoretic axiom, and therefore it is important
to see whether this assumption can be weakened to something that is lower in
consistency strength. In fact, there are weaker versions of PFA that still work with
the main theorem. It is also possible to make slightly different assumptions on X.
Instead of assuming that X is proper, it is sufficient to assume that X is the union
of a chain of proper Scott sets.
The definition of properness refers to countable structures M ≺ Hλ and the
existence of M -generic elements for them. If we fix a cardinal κ and modify the
definition to consider M of size κ instead, we will get the notion of κ-properness.
In this extended definition, the notion of properness we considered up to this point
becomes ℵ0-properness. For example, the κ-c.c. and < κ-closed posets are κ-proper.
Hamkins and Johnstone [?] recently proposed a new axiom PFA(c-proper) which
states that for every poset P that is proper and 2ω-proper and every collection
D of ω1 many dense subsets of P, there is a filter on P that meets all of them.
PFA(c-proper) is much weaker in consistency strength than PFA. While the best
large cardinal upper bound on the consistency strength of PFA is a supercompact
cardinal, an upper bound for PFA(c-proper) is an unfoldable cardinal [?]. Unfold-
able cardinals were defined by Villaveces [?] and are much weaker than measurable
cardinals. In fact, unfoldable cardinals are consistent with V = L. The axiom
PFA(c-proper) also decides the size of the continuum is ω2 [?]. It is enough for the
main theorem to assume that PFA(c-proper) holds:
Theorem 6.1. Assuming PFA(c-proper), every proper Scott set is the standard
system of a model of PA.
9I am grateful to Haim Gaifman for pointing this out, see [?] for a detailed argument.
SCOTT’S PROBLEM FOR PROPER SCOTT SETS 13
Proof. Every κ+-c.c. poset is κ-proper. It is clear that every Scott set X is (2ω)+-
c.c.. It follows that every Scott set is 2ω-proper. Thus, PFA(c-proper) applies to
proper Scott sets. 
It is also easy to see that we do not need the whole Scott set X to be proper.
For the construction, it would suffice if X was a union of a chain of proper Scott
sets. Call a Scott set piecewise proper if it is the union of a chain of proper Scott
sets of size ≤ ω1. Under this definition, any arithmetically closed Scott set of size
≤ ω1 is trivially piecewise proper since it is the union of a chain of arithmetically
closed countable Scott sets. Also, it is clear that a piecewise proper Scott set is
arithmetically closed. The modified construction using piecewise proper Scott sets
does not require all of PFA but only a much weaker version known as PFA−. The
axiom PFA− is the assertion that for every proper poset P of size ω1 and every
collection D of ω1 many dense subsets of P, there is a filter on P that meets all of
them. PFA− has no large cardinal strength. The axiom is equiconsistent with ZFC
[?] (p. 122). This leads to the following modified version of the main theorem:
Theorem 6.2. Assuming PFA−, every piecewise proper Scott set of size ≤ ω2 is
the standard system of a model of PA.
Proof. It suffices to show that the ω2-Ehrenfeucht Principle holds for piecewise
proper Scott sets of size ω2. So suppose M is a model of PA of size ω1 and X is a
piecewise proper Scott set of size ω2 such that SSy(M) ⊆ X. Since X is piecewise
proper, it is the union of a chain of proper Scott sets Xξ for ξ < ω2. Fix any A ∈ X,
then there is an ordinal α < ω2 such that SSy(M) and A are contained in Xα. Since
Xα is proper, the ω2-Ehrenfeucht Principle holds for Xα by Theorem 3.4. Thus,
there is M ≺ N such that A ∈ SSy(N) ⊆ Xα ⊆ X. 
7. When is X/Fin Proper or Piecewise Proper?
Here, I give an overview of what is known about the existence of proper and
piecewise proper Scott sets. Recall that for a property of posets P, if X is arith-
metically closed and X/Fin has P, I say that X has property P.
Theorem 7.1. Any arithmetically closed countable Scott set is proper and P(N) is
proper.
Proof. The class of proper posets includes c.c.c. and countably closed posets. An
arithmetically closed countable Scott set is c.c.c. and P(N) is countably closed. 
We are already in a better position than with c.c.c. Scott sets since we have
an instance of an uncountable proper Scott set, namely P(N). This does not,
however, give us a new instance of Scott’s Problem since we already know by the
Compactness Theorem that there are models of PA with standard system P(N).
The easiest way to show that a poset is proper is to show that it is c.c.c. or
countably closed. We already know that if a Scott set is c.c.c., then it is countable
(Theorem 2.2). So this condition gives us no new proper Scott sets. It turns out
that neither does the countably closed condition.
Theorem 7.2. If X is any Scott set such that X/Fin is countably closed, then
X = P(N).
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Proof. First, I claim that if X/Fin is countably closed, then X is arithmetically
closed. I will show that for every sequence 〈Bn | n ∈ N〉 coded in X, there is C ∈ X
deciding 〈Bn | n ∈ N〉. This suffices by Theorem 3.3. Fix 〈Bn | n ∈ N〉 coded in X.
Define a descending sequence B∗0 ≥ B
∗
1 ≥ · · · ≥ B
∗
n ≥ · · · of elements of X/Fin by
induction on n such that B∗0 = B0 and B
∗
n+1 is B
∗
n ∩ Bn+1 if this intersection is
infinite or B∗n ∩ (N − Bn+1) otherwise. By countable closure, there is C ∈ X/Fin
below this sequence. Clearly C decides 〈Bn | n ∈ N〉. Therefore X is arithmetically
closed. Now I will show that every A ⊆ N is in X. Define Bn = {m ∈ N | (m)n =
χA(n)} as before. Let Am = ∩n≤mBn and observe that A0 ≥ A1 ≥ · · · ≥ Am ≥ . . .
in X/Fin. By countable closure, there exists C ∈ X/Fin such that C ⊆Fin Am
for all m ∈ N. Thus, C ⊆Fin Bn for all n ∈ N. It follows that A = {n ∈ N |
∃m ∀k ∈ C if k > m, then (k)n = 1}. Thus, A is arithmetic in C, and hence
A ∈ X by arithmetic closure. Since A was arbitrary, this concludes the proof that
X = P(N). 
The countable closure condition can be weakened slightly. If a poset is just
strategically ω-closed, it is enough to imply properness.
Definition 7.3. Let P be a poset, then GP is the following infinite game between
players I and II: Player I plays an element p0 ∈ P, and then player II plays p1 ∈ P
such that p0 ≥ p1. Then player I plays p1 ≥ p2 and player II plays p2 ≥ p3. Player
I and II alternate in this fashion for ω steps to end up with the descending sequence
p0 ≥ p1 ≥ p2 ≥ . . . ≥ pn ≥ . . .. Player II wins if the sequence has a lower bound
in P. Otherwise, player I wins. A poset P is strategically ω-closed if player II has a
winning strategy in the game GP.
Observe that if X is a Scott set such that X/Fin is strategically ω-closed, then
X has to be arithmetically closed. To see this, suppose that X/Fin is strategically
ω-closed and 〈Bn | n ∈ N〉 is a sequence coded in X. We will find C ∈ X/Fin
deciding the sequence by having player I play either Bn or N−Bn intersected with
the previous move of player II at the nth step of the game. It is not known whether
there are Scott sets that are strategically ω-closed but not countably closed.
One might wonder at this point whether it is possibly the case that a Scott set
is proper only when it is countable or P(N) and a Scott set is piecewise proper only
when it is of size ≤ ω1. In a forthcoming paper [?], I show the following results
about the existence of proper and piecewise proper Scott sets.
First, I show that one can obtain uncountable proper Scott sets other that P(N)
by considering when the P(N) of V remains proper in a generic extension after
forcing to add new reals.
Theorem 7.4. If CH holds and P is a c.c.c. poset, then PV (N)/Fin remains proper
in V [g] where g ⊆ P is V -generic.
In particular, if CH holds in V and we force to add a Cohen real, then the P(N)
of V will be a proper Scott set in the generic extension.
It is also possible to force the existence of many proper Scott sets of size ω1 and
piecewise proper Scott sets of size ω2.
Theorem 7.5. There is a generic extension of V by a c.c.c. poset, which contains
continuum many proper Scott sets of size ω1.
Theorem 7.6. There is a generic extension of V by a c.c.c. poset, which contains
continuum many piecewise proper Scott sets of size ω2.
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Finally, Enayat showed in [?] that ZFC proves the existence of an arithmetically
closed Scott set of size ω1 which is not proper.
Theorem 7.7 (Enayat, 2006). There is an arithmetically closed Scott set X such
that X/Fin collapses ω1. Hence X is not proper.
Clearly X/Fin cannot be proper since proper posets preserve ω1.
Recall that any arithmetically closed Scott set of size ω1 is trivially piecewise
proper. It follows that there are piecewise proper Scott sets which are not proper.
It is not clear whether every proper Scott has to be piecewise proper.
8. Questions
Question 8.1. Can ZFC or ZFC + PFA prove the existence of an uncountable
proper Scott set other than P(N)?
Question 8.2. Is it consistent with ZFC that there are proper Scott sets of size
ω2 other than P(N)?
Question 8.3. Are there Scott sets that are strategically ω-closed but not count-
ably closed?
Question 8.4. Does the ω2-Ehrenfeucht Principle hold or fail (consistently)?
Question 8.5. Does the ω2-Ehrenfeucht Principle hold for models with a countable
standard system? That is, can we remove the assumption of arithmetic closure from
Theorem 4.1?
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